Despite the pepper-spray incident and ensuing media frenzy, largely staying out of the limelight was Vice Chancellor John Meyer. This despite the fact that the vice chancellor is the direct line supervisor to the police chief in the UC Davis organizational chart.
The report from the Reynoso Task Force, along with the Kroll investigations, however, demonstrates that John Meyer played a critical role leading up to the fateful decisions on the fateful day in November. Not only was he the supervisor to the police chief, but he was part of the ill-defined and poorly-named “leadership team,” which made the decision to remove the tents.
The Vanguard will, over the coming days, be analyzing the role each key player had in the pepper-spray incident, and we begin with John Meyer.
In writing this analysis, the Vanguard was informed by spokespersons for the university that Vice Chancellor John Meyer is declining comment at this time.
In a way, Vice Chancellor Meyer foresaw this problem in the days and weeks leading up to the event. Following the media attention focused on the dismantling of the Occupy Oakland encampment by police on Oct. 25, 2011, Vice Chancellor Meyer sent an e-mail to Chancellor Katehi, Provost Hexter and other administrative staff.
On the one hand he wrote that “if protesters attempted to camp on the Quad, ‘Camping is not allowed on the Quad, however, the removal of occupants may create a scene with Police removing individuals and property that could be troublesome.’ “
But on the other hand, “We do worry that if camping persists it could attract individuals that have no affiliation with the campus which raises other security issues. We are assessing our legal options and are not inclined to allow tents or structures.”
Later he expressed similar concern in an interview that was conducted after the November 18 event. He explained, “Our context at the time was seeing what’s happening in the City of Oakland, seeing what’s happening in other municipalities across the country, and not being able to see a scenario where [a UC Davis Occupation] ends well . . . “
He continued: “Do we lose control and have non-affiliates become part of an encampment? So my fear is a longterm occupation with a number of tents where we have an undergraduate student and a non-affiliate and there’s an incident.”
He would go on to render one of the more baffling, if not ironic, statements in the report: “And then I’m reporting to a parent that a nonaffiliated has done this unthinkable act with your daughter, and how could we let that happen?”
The irony is that, through his actions, some unthinkable act did occur with people’s daughters, and sons. But moreover, it shows an almost paternalistic mindset that seems more appropriate fifty years ago than today.
Indeed, the report goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the fears of the administration, including John Meyer, were not only ill-founded, they were not properly investigated. As one commenter noted yesterday, the unaffiliated protesters were largely either recent alums or otherwise Davis residents. And even those were small in number.
However, in fairness to Vice Chancellor Meyer, the Kroll report continues by saying that, according to Meyer, “My concern wasn’t non-affiliates in the Mrak Hall group. My concern was playing the chess move forward and you got an occupation for four weeks and people are attracted.”
On the other hand, Assistant Vice Chancellor Griselda Castro spent time with the activists and on the evening of Thursday, November 17, she reported “to the leadership team later that night that ‘the only non-affiliates I saw were people from the interfaith communities providing food … and they were not spending the night.’ “
However, Kroll reports that this assessment was not shared by campus police, who believed that the majority were not affiliated with the university but, rather, were part of the Occupy movement.
In their analysis, Kroll writes: “Leading up to the eviction, Chancellor Katehi and Vice Chancellor Meyer were not swayed by the reports from Student Affairs staff that the Occupy activists were overwhelmingly comprised of students.”
Indeed, they added, “Even after nine of the ten individuals arrested on November 18 were found to be students (or recent alumni), the perception that there was a significant presence of non-affiliates persisted.”
This is a critical discussion, because it leads directly to the decision to remove the tents based, of course, on a notion of safety to the students – an outcome that was again ironically undermined by the ineffective execution of the flawed operation.
The decision not to allow the tents seems to have been arrived at by John Meyer, with consultation with others including Vice Chancellor Fred Wood.
Kroll reports, “Chief Spicuzza also raised the question of whether a ‘definitive answer’ was reached as to whether tents would be allowed on the Quad. Vice Chancellor Wood and Meyer subsequently emailed each other confirming their opinion that tents would not be allowed.”
The Kroll report makes an apparent typo in stating, “Wood emailed Wood to confirm his understanding that ‘if the tents stayed up for some period of time then Police [are] going to take them down.’ ” In a footnote it notes the email exchange was between Vice Chancellor Meyer and Vice Chancellor Wood, but it is less than clear who sent it to whom in this instance.
The report faulted the leadership team for ineffectively communicating the scope of the police operations to remove the tents.
The task force writes, “No members of the Leadership Team took responsibility for ensuring that all the members of the Team including the Police Chief had a common understanding of the scope and conduct of the police operation to be executed on Nov. 18.”
They add, “We have no indication that members of the Leadership Team other than the Police Chief were aware of or reviewed the campus police department’s operations plan.”
To some extent this failure also has to fall on Vice Chancellor Meyer. The report notes, “No attempt appears to have been made by either the Chief or Vice Chancellor Meyer, her most direct superior, to confirm that the understanding by the police as to how the operation was to proceed was consistent with the goals of the civilian administration of the University.”
The report indicates the members of the leadership team, including the vice chancellor, shared in a decision to remove the tents on Friday.
The Task Force writes: “The members of the Leadership Team, including Chancellor Katehi, Vice Chancellor Meyer, Vice Chancellor Wood, Police Chief Spicuzza, and others, share responsibility for many of the decisions discussed and criticized in this report.”
While there is shared blame here, Vice Chancellor Meyer, due to his position, gets singled out.
They write that he “was an early advocate for the position that tents on the Quad would have to be taken down. He also understood that the deployment of police on Nov. 18 would require the use of physical force and supported this decision.”
They add, “Accordingly, he bears some significant responsibility for the decision to use the police and to risk a confrontation with protesters on Nov. 18. Vice Chancellor Meyer also exercised administrative responsibility over UCDPD.”
Here they hammer him: “In that capacity, he, more than other members of the Leadership Team, should have taken steps to determine if police leadership had concerns about the contemplated operation and to ensure that those concerns were understood and evaluated by the Leadership Team.”
In fact, the report faults the leadership team for the failure to understand the police concerns for the operation, particularly the change from an early morning 3:00 am tent removal to a 3:00 pm one.
The Task Force reports, “The Chancellor was concerned that Friday night was a ‘party night’ and that the encampment might ‘become a place for fun [and] the use of alcohol and drugs and everything.’ Leadership Team members on the call other than Chief Spicuzza worried that conducting the operation in the dark might be unsafe.”
They write, “As noted in the Kroll Report, the timing of a police operation is an important tactical decision. Conducting the operation during the daytime may have jeopardized the legal basis for the operation.”
In addition,” It may well have contributed to the size of the crowd responding to the police action, a factor that increased the likelihood of a confrontation between the protesters and the police.”
Kroll notes that “the evidence indicates that it was Chancellor Katehi who chose this time frame…and that police leadership opposed this time frame but failed to register a strong objection to it with the Leadership Team.”
Furthermore, Kroll views that the “timing of any police operation is a key tactical consideration” to be determined by the police chief. The Task Force writes, “Chancellor Katehi did in fact make a tactical decision: that the tents would be removed during the day.”
Kroll notes, however, that there was no objection by the police chief to this tactical intrusion, stating, “Meyer stated that there was no ‘push back’ regarding the 3:00 pm Friday afternoon time from Chief Spicuzza or anyone else on the conference call” and that “Chief Spicuzza did not raise any strategic or tactical objections to the 3:00 pm operation.”
The issue of violence is interesting, as well.
Kroll reports the following: “Chancellor Katehi’s understanding that ‘no violence’ would be employed in the removal of the tents was not clear in the mind of Vice Chancellor Meyer, however.”
Critically: “Meyer’s interpretation of the Berkeley guidance was that some use of force by police would be acceptable in taking down the tents.” Kroll adds: “When the Berkeley reference was mentioned, Meyer understood that to mean that the Leadership Team did not want the police to use batons.”
John Meyer said, “That was our symbol and direction … If we we’re going to do it, we have to do it in a manner that doesn’t create that outcome. We can’t go there.”
Kroll adds, “According to Meyer, he did not understand that Chancellor Katehi believed that no force at all would be employed in taking down the tents until her comments following the November 18 police action.”
According to Meyer, he understood that “there’s an escalation of uses of force” and that “if I’m trying to bring someone out of the tent or … break a line physically by grabbing your arm and moving you apart … I think I understand that that was still allowable.”
From this report we see three clear and critical contributions that John Meyer made, not only as a member of the leadership team but also as the direct supervisor to the police chief.
First, he made the determination that there were non-affiliates and used that as a rationale for clearing the tents – which was also his determination. Furthermore, he facilitated in the lack of communication with the police on the timing of the operation.
We reiterate this point from the Task Force report: “[Vice Chancellor Meyer] bears some significant responsibility for the decision to use the police and to risk a confrontation with protesters on Nov. 18. Vice Chancellor Meyer also exercised administrative responsibility over UCDPD.”
In fact, they single him out. They write, “In that capacity, he, more than other members of the Leadership Team, should have taken steps to determine if police leadership had concerns about the contemplated operation and to ensure that those concerns were understood and evaluated by the Leadership Team.”
Where does that leave John Meyer? That is a critical question that will be answered in the coming weeks.
—David M. Greenwald reporting
I’ve been wondering since the November incident why Mr. Meyer has been so invisible, given his position re: the UCPD. How do you know he will not continue to be invisible, given his non-response and record so far?
[quote]“Kroll adds, ‘According to Meyer, he did not understand that Chancellor Katehi believed that no force at all would be employed in taking down the tents until her comments following the November 18 police action’.”[/quote]If the Chancellor felt there would be no possibility of the need for force (and thinks she directed such a mindset), why didn’t she send in a couple of her secretaries, four tenured liberal arts professors and a grounds keeper to sweep the encampment? I’m not sure this is really a credible conclusion on the part of the commission.
Meyer probably would have a better handle on the realities of such a police operation (given his direct supervision of the chief) than the chancellor, but it’s difficult to accept that she could be completely ignorant of the possibility of escalating force, knowing she couldn’t control the demonstrators’ actions.
The way this little bit is playing out suggests that Meyer will get the honor of being the highest ranking person to be looking for a new job within a year over this event.
[quote]“Indeed, the report goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the fears of the administration, including John Meyer, were not only ill-founded, they were not properly investigated. As one commenter noted yesterday, the unaffiliated protesters were largely either recent alums or otherwise Davis residents. And even those were small in number.”[/quote]Here’s hoping you’ll avoid the temptation to dress up the Vanguard’s reports of the Reynoso report with such outside bologna or additional investigations whether or not you think they corroborate Reynoso’s findings. The justice’s report is better evaluated–and probably adequately stands–on its own, don’t you think?
It looks like he was worried that female students might be assaulted by outside occupiers. There were many rapes at other occupy sites, and this was not an invalid concern.
The timing was foolish. They should have handed out notices repeatedly to tell the occupiers what statutes they were violating, documenting and photographing everything. Then, if the occupiers repeatedly violated the law, they should have filed charges with the Yolo County DA. No violence and no bad publicity. I wonder if the university learned a lesson from this event.
“The justice’s report is better evaluated–and probably adequately stands–on its own, don’t you think?”
Two points. (1) It’s basically what the Justice and Kroll found (2) the person who said it knew everyone who was there that day and therefore were in as good a position as anyone to properly assess it.
It is worth noting that they had sent in Griselda Castro to talk to the protesters, through that controversial program from last year that the students were complaining about it, she informed them that the occupiers were either students or recent grads and they refused to believe her.
JR
“There were many rapes at other occupy sites, and this was not an invalid concern. “
Do you havre numbers to support the claim of ‘many”? I also heard of reports of alleged instances of rape and other forms off violence associated with the Occupy Movrmernt, but I do not know if these were in greater proportion than is ordinarily seen in a given population . Just because something sounds scary does not mean that it is realistically the greatest threat. From the report, it sounds like the leadership team was using anecdotal information and fear rather than evidence and risk analysis to drive their decision making.
Remember the universal condemnation of the UCDPD lawyer of his preposterous spinning of the report? Remember that? Now, look at the comments above. Anything look familiar?
Just for starters, equating the crime-ridden Oakland Occupy Movement with the UCD community is a stretch that achieves the level of absurdity. I know both cultures from many years of direct exposure, including their propensity for crime. No match, not even close.
The notion that only outsiders are capable of committing crimes on campus, and because we recognize them they would not be criminals, now that is an interesting cultural analysis. Is anybody thinking these pronouncements through before posting them?
The risk that UCD Admin considered did not necessarily come from comparing Davis to Oakland Occupy. It was about Davis itself. According to the report, Castro (the most protective of the Occupiers in the Leadership Team), talked with an Occupier, and the Occupier told her about voting out black block anarchists: (91/190)
[quote]Castro then proceeded to speak for about 40 minutes and the response “was dead silence.” According to Castro, “what I said to them was that this had to be very careful. That we were in this moment in time where there was this massive cultural shift. There is a lot of support for this movement. And that we had to land on the right side of history on this one. And so, I said, you know, I’ve talked with them … I offered alternatives. They said ‘yes, interesting, come talk to us, but [you should understand that] Occupy is the strategy. If you take the tents down, we will be back with more the next day. And if you take those down,
we’ll be back the next day with more. And we’ll merge with the Davis.’ They [also] told me [that Davis and UC Davis are] separate encampments because they wanted that student space and they had different issues than the city … they didn’t want the anarchists here. They said … ‘we voted the black block anarchists out.’ … I asked about non-affiliates. They said [they were] students, you know, there might be a couple of alumni, but then again I saw religious groups out there supporting them.”[/quote]
I do not know whether Occupy decided to have such a vote just because they had the foresight to be caution about Black Block Anarchists (Oakland Occupy group), or that there was a point in time that Black Block Anarchists wanted to join the UCD Occupy, but UCD Occupy voted them out. There is no need to guess which is which, because UCD Occupy knew what that vote was about: whether it was a preventative measure, or whether it was a response to a request. If it was a preventative measure, then UCD Occupy and the Admin were actually sharing the same type of fear. If it was a response to a request by Black Block Anarchists, then the fear by Admin would become more legitimate.
About the two camps of Occupy in Davis, the report had this conversation: (81/190)
[quote]At 1:51 p.m., Chief Spicuzza emailed Davis Police Chief Landy Black (“Chief Black”) asking if he planned to remove the Occupy encampment from Central Park, saying “I am wondering if they will come over to my neck of the woods if they are displaced.”210 This email followed up on the Twitter message that Spicuzza had received that morning, that suggested that the Davis Police Department was planning to remove the City of Davis Occupy encampment.
At 2:57 p.m., Chief Black replied with a brief message, “No plan to move them. Just getting them to cooperate with some stuff (fire safety, etc.).” At 6:17 p.m., Chief Black replied in much greater detail to Spicuzza, saying that there were no current plans to remove the encampment, and further stating, “regarding folks leaving Central Park for campus: we have heard that the young and student members of the Occupy Davis folks are thinking about pulling up stakes (literally) and joining the Occupy UCD group on your Quad. I don’t believe we are the impetus behind that decision since we were pretty low-key today.” Chief
Spicuzza replied, “thanks, but I’m told some of your [sic] are now mine” and Chief Black replied, “that could very well be.”[/quote]
In the weeks after Nov18, there was a concern within UCD Occupy (on the Quad) that the presence of non-student Occupiers was too strong and the student Occupiers concerned that they were dominating the Quad occupation. If anyone want to know if this happened, please ask UCD Occupy, or perhaps check the meeting minutes. (At this point I do not remember whether I knew about this from general assembly or from their facebook.) There was a GA vote on whether Occupy should continue through Winter break, as far as I understood, UCD Occupy was actively making decisions to keep out other Occupy groups (including Davis residents and alumni) from merging with them.
The concern there was not about safety but identity. However, I don’t think the concerns of the Admin was that a fellow Occupy group would intentionally try to assault the UCD Occupy group, but that an assault might happen as a side effect of groups coming together and they might have disputes or see things differently.
[quote]“The justice’s report is better evaluated–and probably adequately stands–on its own, don’t you think?”
“Two points. (1) It’s basically what the Justice and Kroll found (2) the person who said it knew everyone who was there that day and therefore were in as good a position as anyone to properly assess it.”[/quote]Was this poster, whom you suggest was as good a witness as anyone, interviewed by the commission and quoted in the Reynoso report? If not, forget about his supposed evidence unless you’re criticizing the justice for missing his important testimony.
Juicing up your reporting on the Reynoso’s work with some unofficial stuff that comes along dilutes the impact of the report. There’s no reason for you to try to be building a case beyond what in the report. There’s plenty of others who’ll be glad to do that or to argue the other side. I guess my point wasn’t clear.
Your point was clear the first time, so I’ll be more frank. If the information was incorrect, then you would have a legitimate beef. Otherwise, I see it akin to nitpicking. You’re certainly entitled to nitpick in the comments, but I will be grumpy in my response, particularly this week.
[quote]Do you havre numbers to support the claim of ‘many’[/quote]
Take a look at this partial list of occupy camp crimes at the time:
[url]http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/282993/occupy-wall-street-blotter-nathaniel-botwinick[/url]
Although it is clear the UC administration screwed up (as they admit), they had valid concerns for the safety of students.
If your daughter was occupying, would you be worried for her safety in an occupy tent encampment? If something happened to her, would you be saying that the university should have taken no action to prevent possible crimes before having a definitive study of relative crime risk?
The irony of course is that in trying to protect my daughter, they ended up spraying her in the eyes with pepper spray. I’d at least chalk up the former to her own choice, the fact that she is an adult, and her willingness to take and accept the risk. The danger of the color authority is far greater.
Edgar Wai: “There is no need to guess which is which, because UCD Occupy knew what that vote was about: whether it was a preventative measure, or whether it was a response to a request. If it was a preventative measure, then UCD Occupy and the Admin were actually sharing the same type of fear.”
Not likely. The UCD Occupy “preventative vote” could very well be about allaying the administration’s fear so they wouldn’t dismantle the tents.
Given Castro’s comments, it sounds like “proactive vote” was in order, to establish some guiding principle to the fear mongering administration.
Despite the vote, it seems the administrations fear, with was misguided, was acted upon, while the UCD Occupy’s fear, with wasn’t misguided, came true.
“Kroll adds, “According to Meyer, he did not understand that Chancellor Katehi believed that no force at all would be employed in taking down the tents until her comments following the November 18 police action.’ “
“Critically: “Meyer’s interpretation of the Berkeley guidance was that some use of force by police would be acceptable in taking down the tents.” Kroll adds: “When the Berkeley reference was mentioned, Meyer understood that to mean that the Leadership Team did not want the police to use batons.’ “
This is the correct interpretation and undermines the credibility of Katehi’s claim that she expected there to be no violence. The notion that you could send in the cops without them using force is absurd. In Katehi’s post incident email she also seems comfortable with the use of force through her failure to condemn it until days later when it all went viral on the internet.
Although the administration is putting on the best show of seeming transparent and coming clean the coverup and stone walling continue. Katehi’s insistence that she directed there be no violence wasn’t even inferred by her highest subordinate thus calling into question the legitimacy of her main defense that she directed her subordinates as she claims. Meyer’s unwillingness to respond on the record to questions regarding his obvious culpability reflect an ongoing obstruction by administration. I wonder has he yet issued a mea culpa statement as Katehi did on the quad?
For those at the university, in the community or in the media who cautioned us not to believe our eyes or jump to conclusions before the investigation was completed, I wonder, have you had enough yet?
I know for Katehi, Meyer, Spicuzza and Pike I have, and, I am still waiting to hear their penalties as I have since I heard Katehi’s acceptance of responsibility on the quad.
“However, at least initially it seems that President Mark Yudof has issued a vote of confidence.”
“He indicated that, while he has not given the report a full reading, “Even a cursory reading of the report confirms what we have known from the start: Friday, Nov. 18 was a bad day for the UC Davis community and for the entire UC system.’ “
Interesting that Yudolf recognizes that any person could have understood the administrative failure executed on Nov. 18. All this hand wringing about waiting for the investigation has simply been to quiet the outrage of civil society by those who support the university and the chancellor. As someone who has no authority my dog piling posts didn’t need to wait. But now that the “official truth” is out when will all those who cautioned patience join the outcry for justice?
I do want to commend the Sac Bee for not wasting any time in its condemnation once the report became public. Now how about the rest of you?
[quote]But now that the “official truth” is out when will all those who cautioned patience join the outcry for justice? [/quote]
What do you consider “justice” (as a Monday morning quarterback)?
Elaine: I’m not sure what your Monday QB comment refers to, but you’ll recall you told us we should wait for the report before making judgments, now what are we to wait for the report and when are we, in your estimation, allowed to make judgments?
Of course I do not KNOW, but my best guess is they will follow a long exercise of saying they are installing and deploying the “recommendations” for changes described in the report, but the players will either not change at all (my inclination) or by very few. I doubt there will be punishments or even real accountability. The reports and investigations are just part of their exercise and way of doing things as high paid talkers, although I do believe investigation did serve a purpose for giving the benefit of the doubt. We will all get tired of talking about it, what more is there to say really? Maybe a few changes will be made behind the scenes and the rest, well, don’t hold your breath.
[quote]Elaine: I’m not sure what your Monday QB comment refers to, but you’ll recall you told us we should wait for the report before making judgments, now what are we to wait for the report and when are we, in your estimation, allowed to make judgments?[/quote]
You didn’t answer my question – what do you consider “justice”?
You didn’t ask me a question, but I asked you one.
You didn’t pose the question to me. I’m not prepared to answer that question just yet.
Justice in my opinion: The University should pay damages to the pepper sprayed people, Pike, Lee and Spicuzza should be fired, Meyer and Katehi should resign. The new people hired to take their places should have some record of being able to think straight, communicate and fill the designated roles they are hired to fill, including following laws and being in command when that is ones role.
[quote]You didn’t pose the question to me. I’m not prepared to answer that question just yet.[/quote]
I posed the question twice. I’m curious, why are you not prepared to answer? Obviously you don’t have to answer, but I’m surprised at your hesitation…
[quote]Justice in my opinion: The University should pay damages to the pepper sprayed people, Pike, Lee and Spicuzza should be fired, Meyer and Katehi should resign. The new people hired to take their places should have some record of being able to think straight, communicate and fill the designated roles they are hired to fill, including following laws and being in command when that is ones role.[/quote]
“Off with their heads” you mean, even though the students started the whole mess?
Because I learned a lot when I wrote the full articles on Meyer and Spicuzza and I have yet to do that for Pike, Officer O (Lee), Officer P (who I’ll name) and finally Katehi. Once I have done that I’ll be in a better position to render a judgment.
I do resent your comment that the students started the whole mess. They have the right to protest. The police did not have the right to arrest them. Therefore the students did not start this mess.
David took the words right out of my fingers. If you do not think they had the right to protest, what can I say, so be it? They have the right to protest. Therefore the students did not start this mess!
I think the question was directed to me so let me say I don’t know what the penalties should be and what I think doesn’t really matter anyway but let me take a crack at it anyway.
At the least Pike and Spicuzza should be demoted and probably transfered.
Meyer, who, I believe, has yet to take responsibility, should have his portfolio changed so he no longer is in charge of the cops. He should at least be officially reprimanded and possibly suspended without pay for some period.
Katehi should probably resign. I say this because I, unlike many others, don’t find her explanation about no violence credible for the reasons I stated above. To me its nothing more than a cover up of her culpability for her leadership failure. Up until I read about her direction to Meyer I didn’t feel tis way. In my eyes she has no credibility left and can only lead through fear instead of by example. I am sad to say this but it is how I feel.
Elaine
“Off with their heads” you mean, even though the students started the whole mess?”
Even if one believes that “the students started the whole mess”, this does not make any member of the police of administration any less responsible for their own actions. By this reasoning if a wife started an argument, an abusive husband would not be held accountable for beating her up. People, especially those in authority must assume responsibility for their actions regardless of what they consider the provocation. These reports would seem to have determined that the amount of provocation did not justify the response.
Re: Civil Discourse
We were talking about whether the Admin’s fear was misguided. According to the GA notes of Occupy UC Davis, there were security and safety concerns. I don’t know where the notes before Nov18 were. The following corresponded to the time after Nov18. [Ref] ([url]”http://occupyucdavis.org/category/notes/page/2/”[/url]):
[quote]
12/1: “Security: yesterday one of the rules was violated and cops were called. Working on a proposal that would establish a set of guidelines (meeting at 10pm tonight)”
12/2: “Proposal to declare occupy UCD a police-free zone which does not accept the presence and entry of police at any encampments with a suggested personal, formal statement prepared (please do not enter our encampment) and signs at our occupation sights demanding their absence. – PASSED”… “wants a restraining order against Nunoz”… “worries about crimes in our camp”… “the victim can choose if they want police intervention”
12/3: “We can’t secure/control our space with such low numbers, over Thanksgiving dynamic shifted to a largely non-student group”… “Safe/inclusive space should be discussed before we set up camp again, we need to address psychological and emotional comfort of our space”… “Shawn: P.O.C. regarding student/non-student issue: people at camp over Thanksgiving didn’t feel safe because we didn’t have critical mass to make it a safe space for everybody”… “We’re already unsafe on quad, there will be no moving forward in regards to safety over break because not enough people here to respond to these issues” …
[/quote]
Correcting some misunderstanding about the Report:
1) [b]The Kroll report did not say that using pepper spray was wrong[/b], only that MK-9 was not listed on UCDPD Authorized Weapons and Tools policy (113/190). This is what Kroll report said: (156/190)
[quote]A key issue in evaluating whether the use of pepper spray was appropriate is the determination of what type of resistance the protesters seated on the ground with linked arms were presenting: was it passive resistance or active resistance? The UCDPD use of force policies do not provide any guidance. In contrast, for example, the UCLA Police Department’s use of force policy (General Order 11-06) specifically defines the linking of arms by protesters as active resistance (Section 6.2.3 Definitions, Actively Resisting). The California Commission on Police Officers Standards and Training (POST) also defines the linking of arms as active resistance (2102 DRAFT, POST Guidelines, Crowd Management, Intervention and Control, Appendix A, Terms and Definitions, Active Resistance).
Most police departments across the United States use a training device commonly referred to as a “use of force continuum” as a means of training their officers on when and what type of force to use.604 Most of these continuums—there is no standard national continuum—allow the use of pepper spray when confronted with “active resistance.”605 Thus, the use of pepper spray against seated protesters linking arms may be technically permissible as a general matter.[/quote]
2) [b]The Kroll Report did not say that the assembly was legal[/b], it only criticized the Leadership for not clarifying the legal issues.
(113/190)
[quote]On January 13, 2012, Senior Campus Counsel Sweeney provided Kroll with a letter in which he states that “the law that most clearly applies is California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 100005 … which prohibits non-affiliates from camping on University property.” According to Sweeney, “this provision applies 24 hours a day, and is not limited to sleeping hours. Of course, if more than 2 individuals are violating this provision, it is an unlawful assembly and the police may lawfully issue a dispersal order.”[/quote]
(140/190)
[quote]Ten activists were cited and released for 409 PC (present at an unlawful assembly after being ordered to disperse) and 647(e) PC (lodging in a place without permission of the person in control of it). Of the ten activists who were arrested, two were identified as non-affiliates….[/quote]
I think you are misinterpreting the findings here:
The report as you note states, “Thus, the use of pepper spray against seated protesters linking arms may be technically permissible as a general
matter.”
But that is only as a general matter, they then go on finally state in conclusion: “Considering all the available evidence—while recognizing that Kroll investigators were not able to interview Lieutenant Pike to learn and report on his state of mind at the moment he used the pepper spray—the deployment of pepper spray does not appear to have been an
objectively reasonable use of force.”
So yes, they did rule that the use of pepper spray was not a reasonable use of force.
Your analysis of the assembly is wrong as well, but I’ll save that for another article.
[quote]I do disagree with your comment that the students started the whole mess. They have the right to protest. The police did not have the right to arrest them. Therefore the students did not start this mess. [/quote]
THey have the right to protest PEACEFULLY, as long as it conforms with time/place/manner restrictions…
There is no indication that they were not protesting peacefully and there is no indication that they were not protesting peacefully when the police without any legal authority attempted to intervene.
If that was what Kroll meant, then the Kroll’s conclusion needs to be evaluated logically.
On whether pepper spray can be used on seated, arm-linked protesters, Kroll said the following (paraphrased):
1. POST and UCLA PD define arm-linking as active resistance (156,157/190)
2. Most use of force continuum allows the use of pepper spray for active resistance (157/190)
3. Although UCD PD does not have its own departmental use of force continuum, in general, pepper spray against seated arm-linked protesters may be permissible. (157/190)
As you pointed out in your reply, Kroll eventually made this conclusion in the report:
99. (158/190) [quote]On balance, …
Considering all the available evidence—while recognizing that Kroll investigators were not able to interview Lieutenant Pike to learn and report on his state of mind at the moment he used the pepper spray—the deployment of pepper spray does not appear to have been an
objectively reasonable use of force.[/quote]
100: (158/190)
[quote]This conclusion is buttressed by the facts that the MK-9 was not an authorized weapon under UCDPD guidelines and that UCDPD officers were not trained in its use.[/quote]
Point 100 is auxiliary to the conclusion that the use of pepper spray was unreasonable. By Point 99, Kroll had already made that conclusion. Even if UCDPD had its own departmental guideline and they were using MK-4 instead, Kroll still find the use of pepper spray unreasonable.
Then, the question becomes: how did Kroll draw the conclusion that pepper spray was unreasonable in one page, starting with Point 3, that pepper spray was probably permissible, to Point 99, that it was objectively unreasonable?
4. Officer F got out in the back of the circle with and encountered no resistance arrestees two times
5. Officer P moved across the south line with no confrontation
6. 20 minutes after the pepper spray, Pike returned an encountered no resistance when he asked the activists to take down tents that were re-erected.
With only these three points, Kroll made the conclusion that:
99.1. Pike should not have believed that he or his officers were trapped
99.2. Pike should not have believed that he or his officers were prevented from leaving by the protesters
99.3. There was no evidence that the protesters were violent
According to the point 3, there was no mention that any evidence of being “trapped” or protester “violence” is necessary in the consideration to use pepper spray. Kroll did not explain how those would matter. Furthermore:
Point 99.1 and 99.2 did not accurately counter Pike’s concerns. According to his statement: (134,135/190) [Excerpt removed due to length constraint]
According to Pike, the main concern was about removing the arrestees. Pike admitted that control hold was lower on the use of force continuum, but they already had enough arrestees.
Pike’s statement was consistent with the order of events. When the police first confronted the line of standing, arm-linked protesters, the police used control hold and grappling. That was why they got arrestees. Pike did not want to do that again and chose to use Pepper Spray.
Point 6 was logically problematic because pepper spray was a dispersal/pain compliance tool. Pike used pepper spray to disperse and to make the protesters comply. Twenty minutes later, he returned and there was no resistance. The fact that pepper spray was designed to achieve this purpose would disqualify the causal conclusion that the protesters would have been in compliance without the pepper spray. I am not trying to say that pepper spray was effective. I am just saying that the use of that aftermath is logically incorrect to support the conclusion.
To address Point 4 and 5, I will have to first show you a ranking scale of the evidence, starting from the most relevant evidence that would have shown Pike’s decision to be unreasonable at his vintage point on Nov18…
(Continue)
Please note that the following list includes hypothetical situations. They are [b]necessary[/b] to show where the evidence of Kroll stood in the spectrum of objective reasons. I am not trying to bend any facts or cause any misinterpretation of the situation. Explanations of the scale were removed due to length constraint.
1) All arrestees had been moved successfully through the line of seated protesters, but Pike still decided to pepper spray them when no officer was in the circle, and that the objectives of taking down the tents, and the situational objective to transport the arrestees were accomplished.
2) All arrestees had been moved successfully out, the only people remained in the circle were the officers.
3) Officer P moved an arrestee over or through the line of seated protesters right in front of Pike’s eyes.
4) Pike ordered Officer F to move the arrestees through the gap in the back. After Officer F had done that and had reported success to Pike.
5) Officer F moved arrestees out of the circle in the back successfully, without letting Pike know.
6) Officer P repeatedly moved across the south line, and that the protesters seemed nice and non-violent.
7) The seated protesters declared that sitting like that with arm-linked was the last thing they were going to do to resist the officers from their declared demand to let the arrestees go.
According to the Kroll Report, the evidence against Pike’s decision was at #5. Whether #5 is sufficient to say that Pike’s decision is objectively unreasonable, would require an objective rubric to draw that conclusion. That objectivity continuum was absent in the Kroll report.
To properly argue whether the use of Pepper Spray was reasonable, Kroll should address the concerns of the officers.
(186/190)
[quote]Officer P: “It was my belief that to step over the protesting occupiers with prisoners and weapons would be hazardous. The occupiers had
collectively surrounded us and it was possible, if we did step over them, that they could attempt to free our prisoners (they chanted that they wanted them released) or attempt to grab us or our equipment.”[/quote]
Kroll should clarify if there were any regulation regarding stepping over protesters or for officer to walk pass protesters with protester on their back with zero distance.
(131/190)
[quote]According to “I remember going in and out through the crowd with one or two prisoners and … I thought ‘Holy moley! Why is he going in through the crowd like that?’ I would be too scared that people are going to grab my equipment or … push me down and start attacking me or grab the prisoner away from me.”[/quote]
Kroll should also have addressed who would be held accountable if an officer lost his sidearm while trying to go through crowds, or if the grabbed sidearm was then used to shoot someone on Nov18.
There was no evidence to suggest that the population of the protesters share the exact same attitude toward the police. How was the officers supposed to know that not one person in the crowded intended to attack? Also note that if such an attack occurred, the police would be completely defenseless because there would be no direction that they could “shoot back” without the risk of killing an innocent on looker.
The encircling of the police was hazardous. If it was used intentionally, knowing that the police would have a hard time dealing with it, then it could be considered irresponsible as a citizen.
(155/190)
[quote]One contemporaneous fact supports the officers’ stated concerns— Officer P radio request at 3:47 p.m. to speed up the response of the DPD to the scene.596 DPD was not part of the briefing and they were not on scene at the start of this police operation, but at 3:38, only minutes after police had begun making arrests, they were requested to respond.597
After this original request, and after the crowd had encircled the officers, Officer P told the police dispatcher “we need Davis officers now” and the dispatcher acknowledged his request, saying “copy, requesting Davis officers expedite.”598 This is just short of a “help” call—an officer outright stating his need for immediate assistance. The
language and the tone used by Officer P suggest that he was calling in connection with a non-routine situation, if not making an outright call for help.[/quote]
“According to the Kroll Report, the evidence against Pike’s decision was at #5. Whether #5 is sufficient to say that Pike’s decision is objectively unreasonable, would require an objective rubric to draw that conclusion. That objectivity continuum was absent in the Kroll report.”
Part of what Kroll is arguing is that Pike misread the situation and overreacted to it. To me the most compelling problem with Pike’s actions is that the protesters were seated, he calmly walked through them and bathed them in the spray. He had called for mutual aid but not consulted with DPD. In fact they had just arrived when he made the decision. Why did he do it at that time? There was no escalation of events, if anything things had deescalated considerably from the point when they were marching.
Could you clarify what you meant by this sentence: “Part of what Kroll is arguing is that Pike misread the situation and overreacted to it”
Did you mean:
1) Kroll argued that Pike misread the situation and therefore overreacted.
or
2) Kroll argued that Pike misread the situation, and on top of that, even if his perception of the situation was true, he overreacted.