Vanguard Analysis: Chancellor Katehi’s Role in the November 18 Incident

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In the hours and days that followed the November 18 pepper spray event, Chancellor Linda Katehi would at first deflect, then take “full responsibility” for the fiasco.  It is still not clear what it means for her to take “full responsibility.”

At the time of this press, there appears that the Chancellor will survive this, even as the reports paint a disturbing picture of miscalculation and incompetence that goes from the Chancellor’s office to the actions of Lt. Pike and his fateful decision to use pepper spray on seated protesters engaging in what was non-violent protest of university policies and perhaps the illegal tent clearing operation.

The mistakes at the administrative level – all of which ultimately fall on the shoulders of the chancellor are many: failure to investigate the presence of non-affiliates, decision to deploy the police to remove the tents before considering less aggressive measures, failure to determine the legal authority for the operation.

The Task Force singles out the chancellor herself for the decision to deploy police at 3 pm rather than the middle of the day, the chancellor failed to adequately communicate her position on the avoidance of physical force – something that she claimed after the fact.  The Chancellor along with the rest of the leadership team shares the responsibility for the decision to remove the tents.

Chancellor Katehi needs to be graded harshly on the poor communication throughout the administration and also needs to be graded harshly for miscalculations and for making critical decision such as the timing of the operation without either fully communicating with the police and without full buy-in from the police.

Most importantly, as the Kroll report explains, “It was the systemic and repeated failures in the civilian, UC Davis Administration decision-making process that put the officers in the unfortunate situation in which they found themselves shortly after 3 p.m.”

Because we have covered many of the details of the Chancellor’s involvement previous, this report will be more of synopsis and analysis of her specific role.

As we have reported previously, the concern about Occupy Oakland and the November 9 events underlie the concern of Chancellor Katehi and prompt the eventual decision to remove the tents.

It is this fear of “non-affiliates” that becomes the base concern and indeed, on December 20 when the Chancellor was interviewed by Kroll, she expressed concern about the involvement of “non-affiliates” with the UC Davis Occupy movement and encampment.

Like the Vice-Chancellor the concern for “young girls” sleeping in the tents seems to drive this concern.

Chancellor Katehi stated, “We were worried at the time about that [nonaffiliates] because the issues from Oakland were in the news and the use of drugs and sex and other things, and you know here we have very young students . . . we were worried especially about having very young girls and other students with older people who come from the outside without any knowledge of their record . . . if anything happens to any student while we’re in violation of policy, it’s a very tough thing to overcome.”

Indeed, in Chancellor Katehi’s letter distributed to campus protesters on Nov. 18, the day of the pepper spray incident, the Chancellor wrote “We are aware that many of those involved in the recent demonstrations on campus are not members of the UC Davis community. This requires us to be even more vigilant about the safety of our students, faculty and staff.”

However, as Kroll notes, and the Task Force concurs, “these concerns were not supported by any evidence obtained by Kroll.”

As we also know, there was evidence provided by Vice Chancellor Griselda Castro questioning their belief that there large number of unaffiliated people in the camps.

The Task Force reports, “Assistant Vice Chancellor Castro explicitly challenged Chief Spicuzza’s report that a substantial number of the protesters at the encampment were non-affiliates and the Police Chief conceded that Castro’s information was more credible than the reports of her officers.”

However, the Chancellor challenged the report of Ms. Castro, asking if she could “prove” that the protesters were mostly students. Castro replied, “I didn’t ask for IDs. It’s just from my sense of what I know.” The Leadership Team did not discuss the matter further.

As the Task Force reports, “To date, the assertion that many non-affiliates were involved in the Occupy movement encampment on the Quad has not been substantiated. The status of the protesters arrested on Nov. 18 does not support the contention that many non-affiliates were involved in these events.”

The Task Force also notes that there was no evidence that they saw that any further inquiry was conducted to resolve this question.

Writes Kroll in their analysis: “Leaving aside the question of whether this is a valid view of non-affiliates and the threat they pose, there is first the factual question of the extent to which non-affiliates were involved in the encampment.”

Leading up to the eviction, Chancellor Katehi and Vice Chancellor Meyer were not swayed by the reports from Student Affairs staff that the Occupy activists were overwhelmingly comprised of students;” and remarkably, Kroll writes, “even after nine of the ten individuals arrested on November 18 were found to be students (or recent alumni), the perception that there was a significant presence of non-affiliates persisted.”

Chancellor Katehi apparently envisioned the deployment of police on Nov. 18 “to be a limited operation in which police would demand that the tents be taken down but would use no other force to accomplish their mission if the protesters resisted their efforts.”  The Task force notes critically, “The chancellor did not effectively communicate this expectation to other members of the Leadership Team.”

In fact they note, “It is clear that different members of the Leadership Team understood the scope and conduct of the police operation differently.”

And no one on the Leadership Team took the responsibility to ensure that everyone was on the same page.  As the Kroll Report concludes, there was a “significant gap between the instructions that Chancellor Katehi believed the Leadership Team had provided to campus police (‘no violence’) and the police operation that was planned, mounted, and finally carried out by the campus police under her authority.”

Task Force puts the primary responsibility for the failure to communicate her position of non-force on the Chancellor.

They note that at the November 17 meetings, “Chancellor Katehi failed to express in any meaningful way her expectation that the police operation was to be sharply limited so that no use of force would be employed by police officers other than their demand that the tents be taken down.”

They add, “The lack of effective communication by the Chancellor at this time not only contributed to misunderstandings that made it difficult to evaluate the decision to use police to take down the tents. This communication failure also substantially undermined the goal of avoiding a physical confrontation between the police and protesters.”

The Task Force nailed the administration in particular for the lack of clear lines delineating responsibility for decision making between the civilian administrators and the police.

Kroll hits the note perfectly when they write, it was “a process where the police department failed to express its objections and concerns adequately, while the administration failed both to hear the police and to understand that they were ‘heard’ to be issuing an order.”

Worse yet, there is not only a communication issue here but a clear line is crossed. Kroll notes that “the evidence indicates that it was Chancellor Katehi who chose this time frame…and that police leadership opposed this time frame but failed to register a strong objection to it with the Leadership Team.”

“On the 10 p.m. call, Chancellor Katehi expressed her concern that Friday night was a “party night” and the bars would be closing just prior to the time of the operation,” Kroll reports.

Kroll continues, “According to Chancellor Katehi, she had observed that “there are a lot of kids who go out to private parties very late … as you go to Saturday. And we thought … we did not want this to become a place where people come for fun. We worried about the use of alcohol and drugs and everything.”

Chancellor Katehi “was adamant that she didn’t want them to stay one more night” and “was worried, since it was a Friday night that it would become a party and impossible for us to do what was asked of us…remove the tents.”

Furthermore, Kroll views the “timing of any police operation is a key tactical consideration” to be determined by the Police Chief. Chancellor Katehi did in fact make a tactical decision: that the tents would be removed during the day.”

The Task Force aptly sums up the problem: “The above example is illuminating in that it showcases a process where a major incident objective was determined in an ad hoc setting and where the principal decision maker, Chancellor Katehi, did not realize her statement was both viewed as an “executive order” and a “tactical decision.””

Therefore, the Task Force assigns primary individual responsibility to the Chancellor for the decision to deploy the police at 3 pm rather than during the night or early in the morning.  The result of that meant that instead of a relatively small group, the police had to deal with a large and growing crowd.

As the Task Force writes, “No one can know for certain what would have happened if the police operation had been conducted in the early morning on Saturday, or a day or two later on Sunday or Monday night. What is clear is that the timing of a police operation is a tactical decision that should be determined by police officers rather than civilian administrators.”

Adds Kroll, “By insisting that the tents not be allowed to stay up on Friday night, Chancellor Katehi did in fact make a tactical decision: that the tents would be removed during the day.”

We have already spent quite a bit of time discussing the lack of legal basis for the police operation.  As we know, Kroll indicates that they were “unable to identify the legal basis for the decision of the Leadership Team to act against the protesters and for the operation mounted by the UCDPD.”

Kroll writes quoting the Chancellor, “it became clear … from Griselda [Castro] that [the activists] did not want to talk, at least there was a big group … that was not interested in being engaged. Then we said, ‘All right, well, how can we remove the tents?’ That was the discussion.”

According to Chancellor Katehi, “in all of these phone calls [leading up to November 18], I never felt that I made an executive decision where people disagreed. I felt that we were coming to a decision as a group.”

In fact, according to Kroll, the Chancellor was not sure when the final decision was made to remove the encampment from the Quad.  What we do know is that it was Lt. Pike and Lt. Swartwood who were the ones who questioned the legality of the operation and who demanded to speak to Campus Council Sweeney.

The key finding of the Kroll report bears repeating, ” While the deployment of the pepper spray on the Quad at UC Davis on November 18, 2011 was flawed, it was the systemic and repeated failures in the civilian, UC Davis Administration decision-making process that put the officers in the unfortunate situation in which they found themselves shortly after 3 p.m. that day.”

Moreover, the UC Davis Administrative code makes clear that the Chancellor “is the person ultimately responsible for all functions of the campus community.”

Indeed, the Chancellor attempts to diffuse responsibility as she told Kroll Investigators “the Chancellor told Kroll investigators that she favors a participatory style of leadership involving consensus-building rather than an authoritative style of leadership.”

However, as the Task Force points out, it was precisely this “informal, consensus-based decision-making process” that proved “ineffective for supporting a major extraordinary event.”

As Kroll describes it, “The Leadership Team did not have a formal name or roster of members, met via conference call, and did not have an agreed upon method to communicate or record decisions.”

Writes the Task Force, “This structure failed to effectively support managing the events of November 18.”

The Task Force argues that NIMS/ SEMS protocols call for “a formal organizational structure and decision-making process when preparing for or managing major events. The process by which incident objectives are determined is clearly defined and recorded. The very purpose of this formal structure is to ensure uniform understanding and reduce miscommunication.”

Kroll adds, “the outcome is that “key decision-makers on the Leadership Team held conflicting views on what decisions were made, when they were made and the basis on which they were made.”

It would appear that so long as Chancellor Katehi is able to achieve her fundraising goals, President Yudof, the Board of Regents and even much of the faculty is willing to overlook this embarrassing string of failures that culminated in the national embarrassment that was pepper spray incident.

It would appear that despite damning and embarrassing incompetence both in the structure and processes as well as the decisions – all of which led to the pepper spray – that Chancellor Katehi will get another chance to get this right or have a repeat incident.

—David M. Greenwald reporting

About The Author

David Greenwald is the founder, editor, and executive director of the Davis Vanguard. He founded the Vanguard in 2006. David Greenwald moved to Davis in 1996 to attend Graduate School at UC Davis in Political Science. He lives in South Davis with his wife Cecilia Escamilla Greenwald and three children.

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25 Comments

  1. Briankenyon

    Her defense was she was off-campus schmoozing donors that day, didn’t have time to tend to the campus leadership aspect of her job (which pays how many hundreds of thousands of dollars a year?). She should stay on campus and do her job first and foremost. Didn’t she learn anything from her Walk Of Shame?

  2. Phil Coleman

    Chancellor Katehi made one indisputable solitary executive decision, a decision that was not even in her area of responsibility. She overrode the police tactical responsibility to execute an early morning intervention. Instead, she declared a time that resulted in maximum exposure, maximum bystander attendance and interference, and questionable legality (the law enforced was for OVERNIGHT camping). The question that begs for an answer from the Chancellor is “How shall you demonstrate accepting full responsibility on this single grievous error?”

    As to the legality of the police intervention, it is interesting to note that it was police officers (presumably non-attorneys) who were the only persons to raise the issue of the legality of the enforcement. As I recall, there was at least one, perhaps two, attorneys on the Leadership Team. If this is correct, should somebody extend full responsibility to that level of “leadership” as well.

  3. Edgar Wai

    By Nov18, the regulation prohibiting overnight camping was already violated because the tents started on Nov17.

    Where is the information that Katehi was off-campus that day?

  4. Matt Williams

    Phil, if you drive through an intersection and are photographed breaking the law, and the police come to your door the next day to take you into custody or inform you that you must appear in court, is what the police are doing illegal because it isn’t happening during the same timeframe of the violation?

  5. Mr.Toad

    “In the hours and days that followed the November 18 pepper spray event, Chancellor Linda Katehi would at first deflect, then take “full responsibility” for the fiasco. It is still not clear what it means for her to take “full responsibility.’ “

    “At the time of this press, there appears that the Chancellor will survive this, …”

    Good lead but why let her off the hook so quickly. The University effectively played for time but you should have simply said you were waiting to hear what taking responsibility means. I am still waiting to find out.

  6. David M. Greenwald

    “Phil, if you drive through an intersection and are photographed breaking the law, and the police come to your door the next day to take you into custody or inform you that you must appear in court, is what the police are doing illegal because it isn’t happening during the same timeframe of the violation? “

    If it is a misdemeanor, the answer would be yes. The police cannot arrest you for a misdemeanor that they did not personally witness. If it is a felony, then the answer is no.

  7. David M. Greenwald

    “I have wondered how you get cited by mail.”

    You can get a citation via the mail. You can also as the students involved in the bank action be ordered to appear in court for a misdemeanor.

  8. Dr. Wu

    [quote]It is still not clear what it means for her to take “full responsibility.”[/quote]

    That is an empty expression.

    [quote]Chancellor Katehi needs to be graded harshly[/quote]

    Perhaps, but after talking to faculty at UCD, I am less harsh. Clearly she screwed up but the pepper spray incident was exacerbated by Pike and others.

    [quote]Her defense was she was off-campus schmoozing donors that day,[/quote]

    That is her job. For those who haven’t noticed the UC system and education in general in this state are facing a fiscal crisis. Katehi needs to raise money.

    The more I think about it, the more I would be inclined to give her another chance. I hasten to add that this is a UCD decision not a Davis community decision.

  9. Phil Coleman

    “Phil, if you drive through an intersection and are photographed breaking the law, and the police come to your door the next day to take you into custody or inform you that you must appear in court, is what the police are doing illegal because it isn’t happening during the same timeframe of the violation? ”

    Two unrelated issues here. A 3am overnight camping arrest is defensible since the “overnight” element is met by the 3am time itself. A 3pm enforcement of tent removal invites the defense, “I was just day camping!” Moving in at 3pm also puts the officers at the distinct disadvantage of having to determine which tents were present the night before, and which one were maybe not. I presume they removed all the tents. Problem there.

    Generally, misdemeanors and traffic infractions are enforced by the direct observation of the offense by a law enforcement officer. However, it is legally possible for a citizen to have an observed misdemeanor or traffic infraction enforced by the “complaint/warrant” process. Policies vary on this option as determined by a particular county district attorney. The “warrant” could be a mailed citation or Notice to Appear.

  10. Matt Williams

    David M. Greenwald

    [i]”If it is a misdemeanor, the answer would be yes. The police cannot arrest you for a misdemeanor that they did not personally witness. If it is a felony, then the answer is no.”[/i]

    David, I believe you are wrong on that. Virtually all the camera documented speeding or red light violation tickets are misdemeanors, and there is absolutely no problem for either the police or the courts in processing them at a time other than the time when they occurred. Very few such violators are ever arrested, but I know that bench warrants are indeed created after the fact and arrests are made after the fact.

  11. Matt Williams

    Phil Coleman said . . .

    [i]”Two unrelated issues here. A 3am overnight camping arrest is defensible since the “overnight” element is met by the 3am time itself. A 3pm enforcement of tent removal invites the defense, “I was just day camping!” Moving in at 3pm also puts the officers at the distinct disadvantage of having to determine which tents were present the night before, and which one were maybe not. I presume they removed all the tents. Problem there.”[/i]

    From a practical perspective in my opinion, it is only a problem if there were more tents at 3pm than there were at 3am. Was there any police “obsevation” at 3am?

  12. medwoman

    “However, the Chancellor challenged the report of Ms. Castro, asking if she could “prove” that the protesters were mostly students. Castro replied, “I didn’t ask for IDs. It’s just from my sense of what I know.” The Leadership Team did not discuss the matter further.”

    It is interesting to me that the Chancellor appears to be basing much of her decision making on an “argument from ignorance” asserting that the proposition that there are non affiliates present is true because Vice Chancellor Castro has not proven it false. She and other members of the leadership team then allow their fears about the possible future actions of these hypothetical individuals to govern their decision making.
    At no time does she appear to request that anyone, student affairs, the police, or anyone provide actual data rather than speculation.
    Two points about this:
    1) Is this an isolated instance of flawed reasoning, or is this representative of her decision making process ?
    2) This kind of faulty thought process is much more likely to slide in a conference call format with no formal minute recording. It is inconceivable to me that major decisions were being made in such a cavalier manner. That someone who has risen to the position of Chancellor would conduct business in such an apparently sloppy manner is a larger concern to me than this isolated decision. It is incredible to me that someone having as much authority and resources as I am sure she must have would not have the ability to set regular leadership team meetings, held in person with
    quorums, minutes, formal action plans, and the ability to convene emergency meetings with most of the members in the same location with call in capability for anyone not on campus. If rectifying this situation is not on the top of the Chancellor’s to do list, then I would seriously question her
    demonstrated leadership capacity.

  13. David M. Greenwald

    Matt: Those are infractions not misdemeanors. And second, as the former Chief explained, you are not arrested, but rather ordered to appear in court.

  14. E Roberts Musser

    [quote]Chancellor Katehi made one indisputable solitary executive decision, a decision that was not even in her area of responsibility. She overrode the police tactical responsibility to execute an early morning intervention. Instead, she declared a time that resulted in maximum exposure, maximum bystander attendance and interference, and questionable legality (the law enforced was for OVERNIGHT camping). The question that begs for an answer from the Chancellor is “How shall you demonstrate accepting full responsibility on this single grievous error?”

    As to the legality of the police intervention, it is interesting to note that it was police officers (presumably non-attorneys) who were the only persons to raise the issue of the legality of the enforcement. As I recall, there was at least one, perhaps two, attorneys on the Leadership Team. If this is correct, should somebody extend full responsibility to that level of “leadership” as well.[/quote]

    Well said!

  15. J.R.

    The Kroll report contains very troubling evidence that certain faculty were not only leading these student protests. THey were actually pressuring their students to participate. Even worse, they were giving class credit to students who participated. This completely contradicts what dmg has been telling us. See for yourself.

    Excerpts from the Kroll report:

    Page 35
    The administration was informed by Student Affairs staff that there was “considerable faculty involvement” with the rally and Chief Spicuzza reported that she was “being told [that] instructors are telling students to attend the Quad event and receive extra credit.134 Spicuzza followed up with an email that UCDPD officers had received from a UC Davis student, in which a professor offered extra credit to students who attended the noon rally on that day and wrote a two page report “on what you learned/saw.” Chief Spicuzza forwarded this email to Wood, Meyer and Hexter, writing “kept [sic] it to just the three of you at this time.”

    Page 36
    “Professor Joshua Clover spoke to the group, warning them about cooperating with the administration, urging them to take matters into their own hands and stating, “right now, we’re the law.”

    We can add to Katehi’s list of errors that she did not take firm action against these disgraceful faculty and did not protect their students.

  16. Mr.Toad

    “Her defense was she was off-campus schmoozing donors that day,”

    “That is her job. For those who haven’t noticed the UC system and education in general in this state are facing a fiscal crisis. Katehi needs to raise money. “

    No, its all her responsibility. She is the captain of the ship. It is not one part or another. It all interlocks anyway; fundraising and tuition, budgeting expenses including labor, managing dissent and maintaining order and safety. She failed in many of her responsibilities. She acknowledged and accepted her failure but she has yet to accept any consequences for her failure. There have been calls for patience during multiple investigations. I continue to await the outcomes to see what punishment, if any, she will face. Without public acceptance of consequences her leadership will be marred by a lack of credibility and she will lose the respect of the community. No matter what she does short of accepting some sort of penalty this incident will always linger in the back of peoples minds, she will never again command respect only obedience.

  17. E Roberts Musser

    [quote]The Kroll report contains very troubling evidence that certain faculty were not only leading these student protests. THey were actually pressuring their students to participate. Even worse, they were giving class credit to students who participated. This completely contradicts what dmg has been telling us. See for yourself.

    Excerpts from the Kroll report:

    Page 35
    The administration was informed by Student Affairs staff that there was “considerable faculty involvement” with the rally and Chief Spicuzza reported that she was “being told [that] instructors are telling students to attend the Quad event and receive extra credit.134 Spicuzza followed up with an email that UCDPD officers had received from a UC Davis student, in which a professor offered extra credit to students who attended the noon rally on that day and wrote a two page report “on what you learned/saw.” Chief Spicuzza forwarded this email to Wood, Meyer and Hexter, writing “kept [sic] it to just the three of you at this time.”

    Page 36
    “Professor Joshua Clover spoke to the group, warning them about cooperating with the administration, urging them to take matters into their own hands and stating, “right now, we’re the law.”

    We can add to Katehi’s list of errors that she did not take firm action against these disgraceful faculty and did not protect their students. [/quote]

    Excellent points!

    [quote]No matter what she does short of accepting some sort of penalty this incident will always linger in the back of peoples minds, she will never again command respect only obedience.[/quote]

    What sort of penalty do you propose? I’m curious…

  18. Matt Williams

    Mr.Toad said . . .

    [i]”No, its all her responsibility. She is the captain of the ship. It is not one part or another. It all interlocks anyway; fundraising and tuition, budgeting expenses including labor, managing dissent and maintaining order and safety. She failed in many of her responsibilities. She acknowledged and accepted her failure but she has yet to accept any consequences for her failure.”[/i]

    Toad, you missed a real opportunity. I fully expected that you would say that her failure was Sue Greenwald’s fault. 8>)

    All kidding aside, what meaningful consequences are you looking for for her?

  19. Matt Williams

    E Roberts Musser asked . . .

    [i]”What sort of penalty do you propose? I’m curious…”[/i]

    I guess it is pretty clear that I think that is a great question.

  20. Mr.Toad

    It is not my place to decide I don’t have all the facts and she doesn’t answer to me. It would be better to ask the decision makers that question.

    I tend to think these things need to be kept in perspective. I thought Pike should be demoted and transferred. Hard to see that happening now that Spicuzza was forced out. So i’m really not a good one to ask. I’m trying to add humanity to it. We all screw up. When those with great authority screw up there are ramifications. The hollow taking of responsibility without consequences is a get out of jail free card that allows further authoritarian actions to go on without limit. We can see this in the many new tactical ways administration is tightening its grip over institutional resources. Taking control of the Aggie seems to be the latest. Accepting consequences would deflate the detached from reality Bourbon king like imperial quality of Mrak Hall that hangs over the campus in so many ways today.

    Accepting some consequence, whatever it may be, perhaps some sort of community service where she physically serves those she is supposed to serve, as long as it satisfies a large portion of the community, will provide the catharsis this community needs to move forward. It would show that the university is part of the community not above it. It would humanize the Chancellor. It would be a Rodney King moment of “Can’t we all just get along.” What it looks like now as we wait for the process to play out is a Simi Valley style whitewash and we all know that won’t be the end of the story. It wasn’t for LA and it won’t be for Davis either.

  21. JustSaying

    “The Kroll report contains very troubling evidence that certain faculty were not only leading these student protests. THey were actually pressuring their students to participate. Even worse, they were giving class credit to students who participated. This completely contradicts what dmg has been telling us. See for yourself.”

    Vey troubling indeed. The active leadership of a number of UCD professors and graduate teaching assistants in organizing and conducting these demonstrations pretty well assures they will go beyond lawful protests into law-breaking. This dramatically increases the chances the police or the demonstrators will take some action that escalates the event and someone gets hurt.

    The reason the professors poison the activity, in my opinion, is that their professed objective is different than the students’ purpose. The professors are part of a long term movement to undermine the UC administration, to get the university leaders to quit or be fired.

    Violence and serious disruption might backfire if advanced by students, but it serves the purposes of the professors who take pride in being seen as educational anarchists. So the students get punished for going over the legal limits in their roles as tools of “we are the law here now” supposed “educators” who are as much on the UCD payroll as the chancellor they keep trying to undermine.

    Two questions: Why don’t they go “teach” somewhere else if they find they don’t like the leadership here? Why aren’t they fired for serving our students so poorly?

  22. E Roberts Musser

    [quote]Violence and serious disruption might backfire if advanced by students, but it serves the purposes of the professors who take pride in being seen as educational anarchists. So the students get punished for going over the legal limits in their roles as tools of “we are the law here now” supposed “educators” who are as much on the UCD payroll as the chancellor they keep trying to undermine.

    Two questions: Why don’t they go “teach” somewhere else if they find they don’t like the leadership here? Why aren’t they fired for serving our students so poorly?[/quote]

    Excellent question!

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